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This paper aims at analysing the recent CAP reform from the perspective of the current general and 
strategic objectives of the EU as defined by the Lisbon Strategy. A critical appraisal of the CAP 
impact  in  terms  of  regional  growth  is  carried  out.  Firstly  from  a  strictly  conceptual  and 
methodological point of view, then by analysing more in detail how CAP reform (of both Pillar I 
and II) might have actually affected the role of the CAP in promoting (or hindering) regional 
growth  and,  therefore,  convergence.  Empirical  evidence  provided  by  the  different  available 
methodologies has progressively emerged in the very last years. Though a conclusive answer on the 
impact  of  the  reform  can  not  be  drawn,  it  still  emerges  that  the  role  of  CAP  design  and 
implementation in affecting regional growth and convergence is usually underestimated and often 
neglected in the discussions about the future of the CAP. At the same time, however, this role is not 
univocal and strongly case-specific, as it substantially differs across regions according to their 
socio-economic structure and how reforms are jointly implemented.    
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1.  Introduction: scope and limits of the paper 
 
Within the impressive amount of literature produced in the last years about the recent CAP reform 
and its impact,
1 we may found a relatively small number of contributions focusing on whether the 
current  CAP  is  consistent  with  the  alleged  priorities  and  strategic  objectives  of  the  EU  and, 
consequently, positively interacts with other EU policies in achieving these objectives (Kuokkanen 
and Vihinen, 2006, p. 18; Hall et al., 2001; European Commission, 2007a, p. 157). The CAP being 
a strictly sectoral policy (at least its Pillar I), most studies actually focus on the sectoral implications 
of the changes progressively introduced in its design and implementation. Nonetheless, as it still 
remains the most important EU policy (at least till 2007, in financial terms), such evaluation can not 
elude  the  fundamental  concern  on  how  this  policy  coordinates  with  other  EU  interventions  to 
achieve the overall declared EU long-term objectives. An extensive research work has been carried 
out to evaluate the growth impact of structural policies (Bradley et al., 2003; Dall’erba and De 
Groot, 2006; European Commission, 2007a; Esposti, 2008); therefore, it seems fully legitimate to 
investigate such impact for the CAP as well.  
The 2003-2005 reform (that is, the 2003 Fischler Reform of Pillar I and the 2005 Reform of Pillar 
II, the Rural Development Policy, or RDP) (Reg. 1782/2003 and Reg. 1698/2005, respectively), has 
been discussed, designed and approved in the context of a substantially redesigned long-term EU 
strategy, as defined at the Lisbon European Council in 2000 (the Lisbon Strategy or Agenda) and its 
successive reformulations. On request of the EU Commission itself, in 2002, a critical review of EU 
policies  and  instruments  with  respect  to  the  Lisbon  objectives  (and,  in  particular,  a  faster 
knowledge-based growth) was carried out by a group of independent experts led by André Sapir. 
The consequent report (Sapir et al., 2003) inspired many other analyses on the appropriateness of 
the current major EU policies and on the need of substantial reforms. 
The main purpose of this paper is to critically analyse the recent CAP reform from the perspective 
of the strategic objectives of the EU  as defined by the  Lisbon (and Gothenburg) Agenda. The 
attention is on the capacity of the CAP to generate economy-wide structural effects and stimulate 
regional growth. In pursing this objective, the starting point is the Sapir Report itself and its general, 
and generic, conclusion (Sapir et al., 2003, p. 166): the current CAP is inconsistent with the growth 
and cohesion objectives of the EU and, given its budgetary relevance, it actually represents a major 
obstacle to re-direct funds towards such overall objectives (Esposti, 2006).        
Not necessarily agreeing with this conclusion, the present paper shares with the Sapir Report the 
emphasis on overall EU growth and cohesion (here mainly intended as growth convergence
 ) and 
looks at the CAP in this perspective. The title itself patently and voluntarily evokes the Sapir Report 
(“An agenda for a growing Europe”) but with four major differences. Firstly, the paper specifically 
deals with the CAP only, and not the EU as a whole, all its policies, rules and institutions. Secondly, 
emphasis here is on regional growth, therefore not just on growth performance of the Union as an 
                                                 
1 This huge research work on the CAP reform is well exemplified by the proceedings of two recent EAAE Seminars, 
held in Parma (the 87
th) (Arfini, 2005) and in Seville (the 107
th), as well as by the last EAAE Congress, in Ghent.   3 
aggregate, but of all its territories: growth and cohesion will be considered together, as two faces of 
the same coin. 
A third, and more important difference, is simply represented by the question mark in the title. 
While the Sapir Report shows, to a large extent, a normative approach to EU policies, here the 
perspective on CAP and its reform is merely positive. The objective is not to suggest how the CAP 
should be to better suit the EU growth and cohesion objectives. This paper just tries to answer a 
positive  question:  what  contribution  does  the  (reformed)  CAP  give  to  regional  growth  and 
cohesion? This positive approach makes the forth difference also emerge: the agenda, here, is not 
for policy makers but for agricultural economists. It analyses what we know and what we still 
ignore about the contribution of CAP to regional growth and cohesion. 
According to these overall objectives, the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 critically reviews 
how the overall EU strategic objectives as defined by the Lisbon (and Gothenburg) Agenda entered 
and affected the discussion on the 2003-2005 CAP reform. Section 3 deals with the major topic of 
the  paper,  namely,  how  the  reformed  CAP  is  expected  to  contribute  to  regional  growth  and 
cohesion.  This  is  done  by  overviewing  the  basic  conceptual  and  methodological  issues  when 
looking at the CAP from this non-sectoral perspective and then, how the CAP pillars, measures and 
financial flows can be re-assembled according to this contribution to regional growth. The section 
closes with an overview of the methodological approaches that have been proposed to empirically 
analyse the contribution of the CAP along this conceptual framework.       
Section 4 aims at providing the empirical evidence tentatively answering the basic questions about 
the contribution of the CAP to regional growth and cohesion. The section starts with evidence 
provided by the prevailing perspective in empirical analysis so far. It is the so-called distributional 
argument and it focuses on the distribution of CAP funds across EU regions but, at the same time, 
is not much informative and even misleading or confusing, on the real growth processes the CAP 
interferes  with.  Then,  a  different  perspective  is  proposed  (the  counter-treatment  hypothesis) 
emphasizing how an almost opposite effect, with respect to the merely distributional conjectures, 
can be attributed to the CAP within the multisectoral mechanisms of regional economic growth. 
Finally, it discusses the evidence provided by mostly recent empirical literature on CAP reform and 
on  their  possible  effects  on  regional  economies,  in  this  respect,  also  trying  to  draw  some 
implications for the upcoming further reforms (Buckwell, 2008; Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, 
Nature and Food Quality, 2008).   
Section 5 concludes by emphasizing those critical points, from data availability to theoretical and 
methodological issues, agricultural economists are expected to cope with in future research on this 
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2.  CAP, Lisbon and cohesion: a non-sectoral perspective 
 
The Sapir Report approaches the CAP in a singular way. Over almost two hundred pages of very 
detailed analysis of EU policies and institutions, the CAP is practically neglected. Notwithstanding 
its major share on the EU budget, the report only marginally mentions the CAP and those critical 
issues that were under discussion in that period for the upcoming Fischler Reform. In one of the last 
pages, however, in making recommendations on the revision of the budget and funding mechanisms 
according to the alleged EU strategic objectives, the report concludes as follows: “the CAP does not 
seem consistent with the Lisbon goals, in the sense that its value-for-money contribution to EU 
growth and convergence is lower than what is targeted for most other policies. Continuing to fund 
the CAP at present levels would amount to discounting its reduced contribution to the Lisbon goals 
compared with potentially much greater contributions from the other growth-enhancing policies” 
(Sapir et al., 2003, p. 166). 
It is worth noticing that the Sapir group began its work in 2002, when the discussion on the CAP 
reform  (formerly  known  as  Mid-Term  Review,  MTR)  was  just  starting,  and  the  report  was 
published  in  July  2003,  that  is,  one  month  later  the  EU  Council  adopted  the  Fischler  Reform. 
Though the Sapir Report apparently gives a positive evaluation on the direction taken by that CAP 
reform (Sapir et al., 2003, p. 19), traces of this fundamental criticism on CAP consistency can be 
hardly found during the discussion that eventually led to the approval of the Fischler Reform. This 
discussion actually treated the CAP as a strictly agricultural affair and, at least apparently, neglected 
the Lisbon Strategy and the role of CAP in growth and cohesion. 
In 2005, the European Commission (EC) firmly relaunched the Lisbon Strategy putting even more 
emphasis on the “need for higher economic growth” (namely, increasing competiveness, labour 
productivity and job creation) (European Commission, 2005a, p. 1; 2005b). As a consequence, any 
EU policy had to be redirected towards this urgent need: “to achieve these objectives, the Union 
must mobilise to a greater degree all appropriate national and Community resources” (European 
Commission, 2007a, p. xiv). Not surprisingly, the argument of the inconsistency of the CAP was 
raised again by a group of countries led by UK and Prime Minister Tony Blair. They argued that a 
stronger action of the EU in favour of its strategic objectives and, therefore, a larger EU budget 
would be only  accepted under a substantial reduction of the CAP share in favour of structural 
policies (Esposti, 2006).  
The EU Commission itself, in its cohesion reports (European Commission, 2001a, 2004a, 2007a), 
wonders whether the CAP has given any sort of positive contribution to improve cohesion across 
EU territories. In particular, the latter report (European Commission, 2007a), with the reformed 
CAP (both pillars) already entered in force, still states that “the negotiation on the budget of the 
Union  for  the  period  2007-2013  has  demonstrated  the  need  for  reinforced  coherence  and 
complementarity between the different elements of the Union intervention” (European Commission, 
2007a, p. 157), and acknowledges that that the major characteristic of at least part of the CAP 
remains to be “not designed for cohesion purposes” (European Commission, 2007a, p. 167).   5 
The alleged small contribution of the CAP to regional growth and cohesion, therefore, remains a 
substantial argument against the CAP even after its more recent reform. This may also explain why, 
when in 2005 the reform of Pillar II was approved and, almost contemporaneously, the debate on 
the EU budget for 2007-2013 programming period became particularly hot, DG Agriculture firmly 
emphasized that the CAP have been redesigned to make it work for Lisbon (European Commission, 
2005a, section 3). This ambition of the new CAP would not be only limited to the contribution to 
environmental sustainability according to the extension of the Lisbon Strategy made at 2001 EU 
Council  in  Gothenburg  (the  Lisbon-Gothenburg  Strategy).  Besides  this  key  aspect,  in  fact,  the 
alleged contribution of the new CAP would concern regional growth and cohesion itself: “in the 
agricultural  sector,  and  in  rural  areas,  the  EU  is  pursuing  balanced  economic  growth  and 
technological improvement and the creation of new jobs” (European Commission, 2005a, p. 4). In 
article 5 of Reg. 1698/2005, it is clearly stated the RDP has to be coherent with the objectives of 
other funds (thus, competitiveness and cohesion). As a consequence, the evaluation itself of RD 
programmes should assess their contribution to Community priorities:  growth, job creation and 
labour productivity should be considered as prime indicators in such assessment (Mantino, 2006; 
Felici et al., 2008; Marenco, 2008, p. 57).   
In  this  perspective,  both  pillars  are  expected  to  provide  a  significant  contribution:  “a  market-
oriented CAP and a growth-oriented and innovative rural policy are central elements” (European 
Commission, 2005a, p. 4). Defending the CAP as a policy that “will continue to make a concrete 
contribution  to  more  growth  and  jobs  in  the  future”  (European  Commission,  2005a,  p.  4)  is 
especially based on the new “strategic” approach underlying the reformed RDP: “a more strategic 
approach has been introduced into the policy with a strong focus on the integration of major policy 
priorities  as  spelt  out  in  the  conclusions  of  the  Lisbon  and  Gothenburg  European  Councils” 
(European  Commission,  2007a,  p.  169).  Therefore,  while  Lisbon  issues  were  almost  neglected 
during the discussion and negotiation of Pillar I reform in 2003, the reform of Pillar II aims at 
making rural development “central to the Lisbon process”. Though maintaining its character of a 
wide set of small-scale local interventions, the new strategic orientation of Pillar II should be “put 
in  place  to  connect  rural  communities  with  major  investments  under  regional  and  cohesion 
policies”  (European  Commission,  2005a,  p.  2)  and  “to  help  meet  the  Lisbon  Strategy’s  aims” 
(European Commission, 2005a, p. 3). The DG Agriculture itself, in an early mid-term assessment of 
the  2000-2006  RDP  to  prepare  of  the  post-2006  policy,  acknowledges  that  while  many  RD 
measures had a positive impact at the micro level, it is actually very difficult to demonstrate some 
positive  effect  at  the  aggregate  (macro)  level,  for  instance  in  terms  of  employment  creation 
(European Commission, 2004b, p. 118). 
This  attempt  to  give  the  reformed  CAP  a  “Lisbon  justification”,  however,  has  not  been  fully 
successful. This is evident in several documents of the EU Commission that, in relaunching the 
Lisbon Strategy, substantially neglects the role of the CAP. It is the case of the final Report of the   6 
Kok Group (European  Communities, 2004)
2 and the consequent communication from President 
Barroso for a new start for the Lisbon Strategy (European Commission, 2005b)
3.  
In these documents, the main concern to reinforce the Lisbon justification of EU policies is on 
cohesion policy and the need to make it work in the same direction of competitiveness policy rather 
than  interpreting  it  as  of  a  purely  distributional  intervention  (Sapir  et  al.,  2003,  pp.  146-147; 
Bertoncini, 2007; European Commission, 2007a, pp. 172-175; Lefebvre, 2007). This latter vision is 
contrasted  by  those  convinced  that  “promoting  cohesion  is  not  only  ethically  correct,  but 
economically efficient. Cohesion and competiveness are mutually reinforcing goals” (Jouen and 
Rubio, 2007, p. 12)
4. In particular, emphasis has been put on the so-called leverage effect (Jouen, 
2007; Spinaci, 2007), that is, the capacity of cohesion policies to activate resources, institutional 
capacity and knowledge at the territorial level, that eventually also reinforce competitiveness and 
growth policies. 
Such argument supporting the  complementarity between  competitiveness and cohesion policies, 
however, is never mentioned in favour of the CAP, even after the recent reform. This is also true for 
Pillar II for which, at least in principle, this leverage argument could also be valid and perhaps 
supported by major evidence (Mantino, 2006). After all, this scepticism about the real integration of 
the CAP with EU objectives and its (structural) policies finds a further sound confirmation in the 
debate on the HC (Health Check) proposal. The document released by the EC to present it says 
almost nothing on the contribution to cohesion and overall growth and competiveness; the Lisbon 
Strategy is never mentioned (European Commission, 2007b). 
In their very detailed and insightful analysis on the future of the CAP beyond 2013, Bureau and 
Mahé  emphasize  the  “need  for  coherence  (of  the  CAP)  with  broader  policies”  and  the  risk  of 
“incoherence with cohesion policy”. This also suggests that “a tighter connection between the CAP 
and cohesion policies is needed so that the various EU budgets complement each other and do not 
provide conflicting incentives” (Bureau and Mahé, 2008, pp. 37-38). Their concern, however, brings 
about only marginal implications on how the CAP should be redesigned, the strictly sectoral issues 
eventually taking again the first place. Moreover, it seems just an exception within the overall 
debate on the future of the CAP. The seminar held at the EU Commission on “the economic context 
of the HC”, as part of the last EAAE Congress in Ghent, presented and discussed the HC proposal 
and the future of the CAP in detail and with high-level contributions. At the same time, however, 
the  Lisbon  Strategy,  the  overall  coherence  of  the  CAP  in  this  respect  and  its  economy-wide 
implications were barely mentioned.
5     
                                                 
2 “The promotion of growth and employment in Europe is the next great European project” (p. 44).  In this Report the 
word agriculture appears only once, while “Common Agricultural Policy” never. 
3 In this communication, neither “agriculture” nor “Common Agricultural Policy” are ever mentioned.   
4 “It is time to restore the truth as regards the EU cohesion policy […] it is not just an instrument of redistribution but 
also, and above all, a tool to enhance economic and social development” (Jouen, 2007); as a consequence, cohesion 
policy is fully Lisbon-related.     
5 Paradoxically, in these documents and discussions on the future of the CAP, Lisbon is actually much more present in 
reference to the Lisbon Treaty and its recent rejection (Buckwell, 2008). It should be acknowledged, however, that 
during the abovementioned seminar in Brussels, Frandsen (2008) underlined the need for more research oriented to   7 
The EU Commission recently released an interesting non-technical document aimed at clarifying 
how most remarks usually raised against the CAP are neither real nor supported by facts anymore 
(European Commission, 2008). In this list of 10 fundamental criticisms on the CAP, however, no 
mention is made to its eventual inconsistency with respect to other EU policies and to overall EU 
strategic  objectives;  the  Lisbon  Strategy  is  never  mentioned,  as  well  as  its  key-words  such  as 
“economic growth”, “job creation”, “knowledge”,  “productivity”, “cohesion”, etc..
6  
As well emphasized by Kuokkanen and Vihinen (2006, p. 11), it should be acknowledged that, 
besides official discourses and the large amount of financial resources, “the CAP has been only a 
secondary element in the discussion about the Lisbon Strategy”. At the same time, at least in the 
perception of most scholars (Kuokkanen and Vihinen, 2006, p. 16), also the Lisbon Strategy has 
been a secondary element during the last CAP reform and remains such in the discussion about its 
future. In fact, we can conclude that if an exceptionalism holds for EU agriculture for its “special 
role in relation to the state and the market when compared to other economic sectors“ (Skogstad, 
1998), such exceptionalism is also valid for the CAP itself (Kuokkanen and Vihinen, 2006)
7; a 
policy unrelated, if not incoherent, with other EU policies, that is not expected to contribute to 
sustainable growth across EU territories, where sustainability also implies, among other aspects, 
cohesion (growth convergence).  
As already mentioned, the aim of the present paper is not to enter this discussion on “how the CAP 
should be” to achieve consistency with wider EU objectives and other EU policies. The major 
questions, here, are to assess which kind of knowledge and empirical evidence we actually have on 
the  contribution  of  CAP  to  EU  growth  and  cohesion  (that  is,  to  what  extent  the  CAP  can  be 
considered a Lisbon-related policy), to explain why only a limited number of studies have been 
produced (Kuokkanen and Vihinen, 2006, p. 11 e 16) and which major methodological problems 
arise. A sort of exceptionalism also concerns research on the CAP but this seems less justifiable: 
despite the political debate, it remains a key-research issue to investigate whether, and how, the 
CAP really contributes to regional growth and to achieve higher cohesion across EU territories and 
whether, in particular, the 2003-2005 CAP reform really represents a breakthrough in this respect. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
analyse,  understand  and  improve  “the  consistency  across  EU  policies  and  agriculture  contribution  to  growth  and 
welfare”. 
6 Even in documents prepared to support a more radical vision to relaunch the role of the CAP within the EU this issue 
is seldom raised. It is the case, for instance, of the documents prepared by the UK government (HM Treasury and Defra, 
2005) and the Ducth Ministry (Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food Quality, 2008).  
7 This exceptionalism eventually acknowledges the historical bias of the CAP. After all, even the more radical reforms 
proposed over time with respect to the original characters of the CAP, as the Siena Memorandum for instance (Barbero 
et al., 1984), never mentioned a major contribution expected from the CAP in terms of overall EU growth potential and 
cohesion across regions and countries. Economic and social cohesion was not an explicit objective of the original CAP 
(although the fair standard of living for the agricultural population was mentioned in the Treaty of Rome) (Tarditi and 
Zanias 2001; Kuokkanen and Vihinen, 2006, p. 7). Therefore, in CAP history the cohesion issues about the CAP have 
been mostly related to its redistributional effects between urban and rural areas and across social categories (farmers 
and non-farmers; large and small farms). At the same time, it should be also reminded that among the three general 
objectives of the CAP agreed at the 1958 Stresa Conference we also find “to contribute to overall growth by allowing 
specialisation within the community and eliminating market distortions”.        8 
3.  Main conceptual issues 
3.1. The appropriate theoretical framework  
 
The lack of a well-established research tradition on the CAP contribution to regional growth and 
cohesion can not only be attributed to the abovementioned exceptionalism. Another major reason is 
that,  as  a  sectoral  policy,  the  assessment  of  CAP  impacts  outside  the  sectoral  boundaries  is 
conceptually  and  methodologically  complex.  The  presumption  that  policy  design  and 
implementation is fully informative on who receives the support and how uses it, is often false. It 
may be retained as valid for those policies targeted to very specific and well-defined objectives, 
recipients and uses.
8 In other cases, as Pillar I of the CAP, the first-level recipient may be explicit, 
but the actual use and, thus, the very final recipients of this support may be much less clear. More 
direct and decoupled support, in particular, may generate different outcomes depending on how it is 
used and transferred to other subjects, sectors and areas.
9 Pillar II measures represent a mixture 
between  support  with  a  clearly  identified  final  use  (for  instance,  contribution  to  physical 
investments,  R&D,  human  capital)  (Felici  et  al.,  2008;  Mantino,  2006)  and  measures  that  are 
actually  direct  quasi-decoupled  payments  (for  instance,  environmental  measures  that  directly 
compensate the farmers for the loss of production or increase of cost). 
Analyses and empirical works mostly based on funds’ allocation, and its alleged redistributional 
consequence, almost entirely miss the point. Funds’ allocation is just the first stage of the problem 
and these studies implicitly assume that allocation of funds across countries, regions, subjects and 
sectors,  also  informs  on  how  this  support  is  then  re-distributed  across  these  units.  This  is 
unfortunately not true, particularly when a change in the policy regime may substantially modify 
these transfer processes. 
Conceptually and methodologically, analysing the contribution of the CAP to growth and cohesion 
requires models with two basic characters. Firstly, they should admit different possible uses of the 
same support: a direct decoupled payment can be used by a farmer either to sustain household 
consumption (or saving) or to fund investments in his own agricultural production. Qualitatively, 
the outcome in terms of aggregate growth substantially differs due to the different transfers to other 
subjects who may operate in other sectors or even in other regions. Secondly, as a consequence, 
models have to be multisectoral and multiregional (i.e., open) to admit these cross-sector and cross-
region transfers.
10 Knowing how the support is initially allocated among units (farmers, regions and 
sectors)  is  only  the  first  required  information.  Then,  a  correct  methodology  should  be  able  to 
                                                 
8  This  does  not  mean,  however,  that  such  clearly  targeted  policies  are  also  easily  modelled.  For  instance  agro-
environmental measures or support to farm diversification are measures that can be entered in conventional model with 
more difficulties than, for instance, decoupled payments (Balamou et al., 2007). Nonetheless, how this latter support is 
used within the economy remains less explicit.    
9 “While relatively few economic actors will be directly affected by agricultural policy changes, many will be indirectly 
affected through factor and goods market interactions” (Balamou et al., 2008, p. 1).  
10 “Their [of conventional policy evaluation methodologies] major limitations are in the assessment of only direct 
effects on agriculture, excluding indirect and induced effects that, via the circular flow of the regional economy, the 
supported program could induce. To assess these higher order effects a regional multi-sector model is needed” (Felici 
et al., 2008, p. 3).     9 




Figure 1 – Transmission of CAP support across subjects, sectors and regions, and the aggregate 























3.2. Policies, growth and convergence: making the (new) CAP work for Lisbon?  
 
Following this representation, once funds’ allocation across regions is appropriately computed, in 
order to analyse the impact of CAP and its reform along it is necessary to allocate funds within the 
regions, that is, among the different possible uses (SaktiĦa, 2007). Unfortunately, we never know 
how money are really used once they are delivered to the first-level recipient, thus we need to 
assume some bi-univocal relation between the source of funds and their uses. This is, in fact, the 
very  initial  issue  to  be  tackled  when  analysing  the  impact  of  CAP  at  the  economy-wide  level 
(Bonfiglio et al., 2006).  
                                                 
11 According to an OECD study (OECD, 1995), 1 Euro of direct payment provided by the EU produces 0.75 Euro of 
farm income; 1 Euro of price support generates only 0.35 Euro of farmer income (European Commission, 2001b). 
Evidently, the same amount of CAP resources delivered in different forms implies a different transfer of support across 
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n  10 
Once  allocation  across  uses  is  established,  then  funds  are  transferred  over  the  whole  regional 
economy and to other regions according to its economic structure (presence and relevance of the 
different sectors and integration among them), the performance (factor productivity) of each sector 
and the integration with external economies. Eventually, the economy-wide effect (outcome)
12 of 
the policy under study depends on: the (observable) amount of funds allocated to the region
13, the 
(unobservable)  allocation  of  funds  within  the  region  across  different  uses  and  the  (modelled) 
transfer to other sectors and regions. Dynamically and mainly through the tax system, the outcome 
itself (growth and cohesion, in the present case) can, in turn, affect funds’ allocation across and 
within regions.  Such evaluation framework can be thus summarized as a sequence of analytical 






Though  in  a  stylized  way,  we  may  firstly  try  to  represent  the  connection  between  policies, 
according to their sources (funds and measures), and uses. Figure 2 provides this representation for 
three major EU policies, that is, structural policy (Structural Funds and Cohesion Fund), Pillar I 
(EAGF) and Pillar II (EAFRD) of the CAP. 
We can identify 7 different uses of funds, each with a different implication in terms of transmission 
over the economy. Both pillars may be intended as contributions either to income of agriculture 
households or to agricultural investments. Which of them actually prevails depends on how the 
policy is designed and delivered. In addition, we may distinguish between conventional investments 
(physical capital) and investments in human capital, knowledge or R&D, whose aim is to induce 
technological progress and, therefore, increase factors’ productivity. For simplicity, and according 
to discussion above, we call these latter Lisbon-related investments. 
CAP payments, however, can be delivered to non-agricultural uses, i.e. households non involved in 
agricultural production as well as investments in sectors other than agriculture. This is evidently 
possible for Pillar II funds, as some measures are explicitly dedicated to non-agricultural sectors 
within the rural economy (for instance, Axes 3 measures of current RDP). Though marginally, 
payments directly flowing to non-agricultural subjects can also be possible for Pillar I, either as 
administrative/bureaucratic  costs  or  as  coupled  support  in  favour  of  agents  operating  in  the 
downstream sectors of the supply chains (for instance, aids to product transformation).  
 
                                                 
12    Among  possible  outcomes  targeted  by  agricultural  and  rural  policies,  we  may  include  also  environmental  and 
consumer concerns, or market stabilisation (Arovuori, 2008, p. 4). These are evidently aspects of major relevance in 
evaluating the CAP and its reforms. However, they are not considered here as the attention is specifically put on 
regional growth and economy-wide implications.  
13 This very first allocation across regions is the real focus of large part of the literature and often encounters serious 
problems in terms of policy data availability at the regional level; this will be discussed in section 4.1.  
SOURCE USE TRANSFERS OUTCOME  11 
Figure 2 – Flow of funds from policies (source) to uses (and vice versa through taxes); price support 


























A final use of CAP funds is the payment of public goods. These measures cover costs, usually beard 
by farmers, aimed at improving or reconstructing some public good (mainly, but not exclusively, 
environmental  goods).  Therefore,  they  can  be  considered  neither  as  additional  income  (as  they 
cover additional costs) nor as investments, since they do not necessarily generate a demand of 
capital goods and their eventual positive impact on factors’ productivity, if any, is not necessarily 
limited to the single farm or the agricultural sector.   
Similarly, we can allocate structural funds to different possible uses.
14 They are mainly intended as 
investments in non-agricultural sectors (Esposti and Bussoletti, 2008) and can be distinguished, as 
well, in conventional and Lisbon-related investments. However, a smaller part of these funds may 
directly sustain household income (Sapir et al., 2003). These uses may evidently interest agriculture 
and agricultural households, though in a small amount, and probably less than proportionally, due to 
                                                 




























Agr. taxes  12 
the at least partial substitutability between CAP and structural policies (for instance, investments in 
human  capital  for  farmers  are  already  included  in  Pillar  II  of  the  CAP,  thus  partially  rule  out 
analogous investments founded by the ESF).         
As already mentioned, this allocation across possible uses may be arbitrary as can not be usually 
inferred from policy data. These data, if available, only concern the allocation across funds and 
measures,  but  not  all  measures  can  be  univocally  attributed  to  a  specific  uses  or  to  a  known 
proportion among uses. The most evident case is the attribution of direct coupled payments of Pillar 
I. Though coupled to well-identified activities this does not necessarily mean that these funds are 
entirely invested in agricultural activity to cover its costs and improve capitalization (Bonfiglio et 
al., 2006). On the contrary, they may be just consumed or saved by agricultural household and, thus, 
should be regarded as income support. 
Figure 3 exemplifies the reallocation of CAP funds according to most relevant changes occurred in 
CAP design since 1992. From the introduction of direct payments in 1992, all CAP reforms brought 
a relevant reallocation across the different uses of Figure 2 (European Commission, 2001b, ch. 6). 
This is evidently the case of the 2003 (or Fischler) Reform: decoupling entails a substantial (albeit 
to  a  variable  and  unknown  extent)  reallocation  form  agricultural  investments  to  agricultural 
household income; mandatory cross-compliance, as additional costs, a transfer from agricultural 
income and investments to public goods and, possibly, to non-agricultural income or investments in 
form  of  bureaucratic  and  administrative  costs  (Farmer,  2007;  Nitsch  and  Ostenburg,  2007); 
modulation an explicit transfer from Pillar I to Pillar II which implicitly means a transfer from 
agricultural income to either agricultural or non-agricultural investments and to public goods.
15  
The 2005 reform of Pillar II, with the consequent attribution of funds in the context of the 2007-
2013 financial perspectives, should have resulted in a more strategic approach, namely a more 
specific attention to Lisbon-related investments. At the same time, for the period 2007-2013, a 
reallocation of funds (at least in relative terms) from the CAP to structural policies should redirect 
money towards non-agricultural uses (European Commission, 2007a).  
Finally, in the current HC proposal, beside further reallocation due to full decoupling and larger 
modulation, the gradual extension of the regional payments (regionalization) to all countries might 
imply  a  reallocation  of  funds  across  regions  (Anania  and  Tenuta,  2008)  and,  consequently,  a 
reallocation across uses given the different structures of regions.  
Providing a quantification of such funds’ reallocation across uses as  effect of CAP reforms is, 
however,  particularly  difficult.  An  attempt  can  be  made  by  comparing  the  last  year  before  the 
implementation of the 2003 Reform (therefore, 2004) with the first year of full application of both 
reformed Pillar I and II (2007). Such comparison is tentatively displayed in Figure 4. Allocation is 
made  by  assuming  that  decoupled  payments  support  agricultural  income  while  coupled  direct 
payments support conventional agricultural investments. However, we do not actually know how 
                                                 
15 In Pouliakas et al. (2007), for instance, modulation is modelled as a transfer of support from agricultural household 
income  mainly  to  investments  in  the  construction  sector  (but  also  education,  business  services  and  public 
administration).    13 
much of these direct coupled payments, are reallocated to income or to Lisbon-related investments 
(for instance, education).  
 























For Pillar II funds, allocation among uses is achieved by re-classifying the respective measures (for 
2004 and 2007) according to their content and objective as detailed in the appendix (Table A.1).
16 
This reclassification has been then applied to regional RD Programmes to obtain the allocation in 
terms of real funds. This can not be done at the EU scale as detailed enough information for many 
regions or countries is lacking. Values are thus obtained by applying to the whole Pillar II budget 
the distribution across measures observed in the Italian case. Table 1 reports such distribution over 
this reclassifying scheme also for two very different Italian regions (the richest and the poorest, one 
in the Competiveness Objective, the other in the Convergence Objective) and for Latvia, who is 
expected to represent a very different situation in terms of policy implementation not only for its 
geographical  position  but  also  as  a  NMS.  As  may  be  appreciated,  the  differences  across  these 
different cases are not too large; therefore, the use of the Italian averages instead of the real EU 
proportions should not bias too much the attribution of Pillar II funds across uses.   
                                                 
16 An analogous interpretation of 2007-2013 RDP measures according to the Lisbon Strategy’s aims can be found in EC 
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Though several effects are still to be observed after 2007 (for instance, modulation from Pillar I to 
II), we may appreciate that over these three years the main reallocation concerns a reduction of 
agricultural investments towards agricultural household income, though we are not really in the 
condition to observe to what extent this occurs. In fact, the effect of decoupling is, at least partially, 
compensated by the change in the distribution of Pillar II funds across measures and, thus, uses. A 
reallocation  towards  public  goods  can  be  observed  as  well  (though  the  contribution  of  cross-
compliance in this respect can be hardly measured). A further relevant effect, induced by larger 
funding  and  different  design  of  Pillar  II,  is  the  reallocation  towards  non-agricultural  uses, 
prevalently investments. Among these latter (both in agriculture and in other sectors) a larger share 
of Lisbon-related investments can be appreciated (about 1 billion € more in 2007 with respect to 
2004), though in absolute this remains a minor use of total CAP funds.   
Under the extreme assumption that all decoupled payments go directly to agricultural income and 
all coupled payments to agricultural investments (here including the purchase of all agricultural 
inputs),
17 the reforms would have implied a net decrease of these latter for more than 20 billions €. 
Evidently,  this  change  in  the  use  of  funds  may  have  caused  major  impact  within  the  regional 
economy,  in  particular  on  agricultural  production  itself  (in  terms  of  employment,  production, 
productivity,  etc.)  and  on  those  sectors  that  are  more  vertically  integrated  (either  upstream  or 
downstream) with agriculture. Furthermore, the real impact in terms of investments can only be 
detected once all the transmission effects generated by this initial change in funds allocation are 
expressed.    
Once funds are allocated across units and uses, the hardest task in evaluating the economy-wide 
effects of policies is the analysis of their transmission within and between regional economies. 
Figure 5, though in a very stylized form, represents the set of linkages transmitting funds from the 
initial allocation to other sectors and regions, eventually producing the outcome in terms of sectoral 
and regional growth.
18 This transmission occurs through savings and demand induced by either 
consumption  or  investments.  Demand  also  depends  on  relative  prices  which,  in  turn,  may  be 
affected  by  Pillar  I  measures  (price  intervention)  and,  together  with  investments  and  technical 
progress  (i.e.,  Lisbon-related  investments),  may  condition  factors’  productivity  in  each  sector. 
Differentials in factor productivity across sectors and regions, then provoke reallocation of factors 
and, finally, differentials in sectoral and regional output (and income) growth.    
Reconstructing this whole set of relations in a coherent methodological framework also allowing for 
empirical policy analysis is challenging. Nonetheless in the last few years several fruitful efforts 
and steps forward in this direction has been made and now this kind of evaluation, al least partially, 
can be practically achieved. 
 
                                                 
17 For a more detailed motivation of this assumption see Bonfiglio et al. (2006, pp. 126-127). Balamou et al  (2008, pp. 
6-7), as well as Kilkenny (2003),  present a similar assumption in this respect. 
18 For simplicity in Figure 5, and in relative discussion, we do not consider the possible transmission of support to lower 
prices of production inputs. This aspect may actually be relevant in analysing the effect of decoupling in particular on 
land market and price also because it may, in turn, affect agricultural structure (for instance, farm size). For more details 
on these aspects see also Courleux et al. (2008).  Some CGE models, however, do take into account the effects on the 
land market (Roberts, 2008; Finizia et al., 2005).   15 







































Source: European Commission 
Note: Data on RDP refer to 2005 and 2007, for 2005 also include the LEADER initiative; pre-accession funds and co-














































































































? ?  16 
Table 1 – Reclassification and allocation of Pillar II funds (2007) in Italian regions and Latvia (see 
table A.1) 
  Italy 
Italian richest 
region – Lombardy 
(Competitiveness) 




Ag. Income  8.7%  8.4%  5.2%  11.6% 
Ag. Investments  
(non-Lisbon)  29.6%  28.3%  35.0%  38.4% 
Ag. Investments  
(Lisbon-related)  9.6%  6.0%  7.1%  4.8% 
Public goods  37.2%  45.5%  37.3%  24.9% 
Other sectors – Income  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
Other sectors – Investments  
(non Lisbon)  14.5%  10.8%  14.2%  20.4% 
Other sectors – Investments  
(Lisbon-related)  0.4%  1.0%  1.1%  0.0% 
Total  100%  100%  100%  100% 
Source: Elaboration on data from SaktiĦa (2007), Sotte and Ripanti (2008), Sotte and Camaioni (2008)  
 
3.3. Multiregional and multisectoral models  
 
In the last few years a large body of studies has been produced to analyse the impact of the recent 
CAP  reform.  The  focus  of  most  of  these  studies  is  on  agriculture  trying  to  answer  this  basic 
question: what happens to the primary sector after the introduction of decoupling, mandatory cross-
compliance, modulation, RDP, regionalization, etc.? Some of these studies specifically concentrate 
on typical Lisbon-related issues, that is, the reform impact on farm efficiency and productivity, 
innovation and competitiveness, investments, employment and job creation.
19  
This valuable research effort, however, is not completely satisfying with respect to the perspective 
here  adopted.  These  studies  mostly  concentrate  the  analysis  of  CAP  reform  within  the  strictly 
sectoral boundaries. Though they may provide evidence on the possible effects on productivity, 
efficiency, job creation etc., these gains can not be generalized to the whole regional economy. In 
other  words,  they  do  not  consider  the  whole  set  of  linkages  that  eventually  make  these  first 
agricultural impacts transmitted to other sectors and regions. Some works actually try to extend the 
analysis to the territorial context (this is particularly true for RD measures and their relation with 
Pillar I; see Mantino, 2006, for instance). Still, however, there is not a systematic analysis of the 
economy-wide outcomes and, therefore, of the consequences on regional growth and cohesion. 
 
                                                 
19 Just to select a few, we can mention some papers presented at the recent EAAE Congress in Ghent on these subjects: 
Courleux et al. (2008), Katranidins and Kotakou (2008), Zimmerman and Heckelei (2008), Douarin (2008), Helming et 
al. (2008), Lambarraa et al. (2008), Latruffe et al. (2008a, 2008b), Midmore et al. (2008). Older studies still dealing 
with these Lisbon-related issues within the agricultural context (often with reference to previous reforms, in particular 
Agenda 2000) are shortly reviewed in Kuokkanen and Vihinen (2006).    17 
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As argued in previous sections, the economy-wide impact of the CAP only partially depends 
on funds allocation; it is rather subject to the transmission of these effects which, in turn, 
depends on 3 orders of motivations: 
-  (relative)  performance  of  regional  agriculture  (factor  productivity)  that  affects  its 
capacity to hold back resources and contribute to other sectors’ growth; 
-  structure of the regional economy (and in particular the degree of vertical integration 
of agriculture with other sectors); 
-  openness of the regional economy, that is integration with (or dependence on) other 
regions (entity and quality of flows with other regions). 
To  achieve  this  insight  we  need  multisectoral  and  multiregional  models  allowing  for  a 
detailed introduction of policy instruments. Owing in particular to some pioneering works in 
the nineties and to a significant research effort spent in this direction in the very last years, 
three kinds of models can be now adopted to pursue this evalutation: Multisectoral (I/O, SAM 
and CGE) models; NEG (New Economic Geography) models; Multisectoral growth models 
(Esposti, 2009).         
All these modelling approaches are in principle able to represent the complex transmission 
activated by some change in policy design and implementation, though each of them shows 
specific  limitations  and  potentials.  In  practice,  though  they  may  provide  a  detailed 
representation of flows within and between the regional economies, they may still miss the 
correct  representation  of  some  detail  of  the  policy  itself  (for  instance,  the  abolition  of 
mandatory set-aside). Moreover, such complexity often means large data requirements and 
raises several practical issues in their correct calibration/estimation. For these major reasons 
the empirical applications to the economy-wide impact of the CAP reform are still limited 
and, evidently, very recent. A consistent bulk of studies already exists for the first group of 
models, almost nothing with reference to NEG and multisectoral growth models. Nonetheless, 
these still remain the most promising approaches for analysing the CAP from the perspective 
of regional growth and cohesion and deserve a detailed treatment. 
The use of I/O (Input-Output) models to analyse the economy-wide effects of the CAP has 
been pioneered by some early studies in the nineties (Midmore, 1993) and became of larger 
use in the recent  years  (Bonfiglio  et al., 2006).  Its main  advantage is  represented by  the 
possible  large  sectoral  disaggregation  with  several  different  agricultural  sectors  and  food 
industries allowing for a very detailed analysis of linkages related to agricultural policies. In 
practice,  this  potential  is  limited  by  available  information  that  often  requires  the 
regionalization  of  national  or  macroregional  I/O  tables  according  to  some  appropriate 
procedure  (Bonfiglio,  2006),  though,  in  principle,  regional  I/O  tables  could  also  be 
constructed with ad hoc surveys allowing more flexibility in terms of sectoral disaggregation 
and precision.    19 
In this latter case, however, it would be preferable to use surveys to build regional SAMs 
(Social Accounting Matrices), as they actually allow for a more complete representation of 
the regional economy and, therefore, for a more accurate policy analysis. I/O models only 
consider flows across sectors, thus they can be very useful to analyse vertical integration of 
agriculture  with  food  sectors  or  other  industries.  Nonetheless,  relations  occurring  among 
agents (households, institutions, etc.) as well as flows of factors of production are lacking. 
Considering the change in funds allocation depicted in figure 3, the inclusion of all policy 
measures  in  I/O  models  is  not  easy  as  they  must  be  directly  expressed  as  change  of  the 
demand vector. 
It is becoming prevalent to use regional I/O tables as a base to build SAM models. These 
show greater flexibility in entering policies, though construction of accurate SAMs can be 
unaffordable in many regions for the consistent amount of additional statistical information or 
superior data they require. Once this effort is made and the regional SAM constructed, it often 
becomes “natural”, in turn, to use the SAM not as such but as the base to build and calibrate 
CGE  (Computable  General  Equilibrium)  models  (Roberts,  2007;  Pouliakas  et  al.,  2007). 
Differently from I/O and SAM, CGE models represent equilibrium relations in all relevant 
markets  (goods  and  services,  factors  of  productions,  etc.)  together  with  a  complete 
representation of flows occurring among sectors and agents within the regional economy. As 
market equilibrium models, these approaches also allow a more explicit role of prices and this 
may be of particular interest as far as CAP admits market intervention. Starting from the 
pioneering works of Kilkenny (1993) and Lofgren et al. (2002), several studies attempted to 
analyse the economy-wide effects of the CAP within a CGE framework.
20  
However, calibration of CGE may be empirically critical. Additional information concerning, 
for instance, quantities, prices and elasticities, as well as arbitrary assumptions, are required   
(Roberts, 2007; Pouliakas et al., 2007). Therefore, sensitivity analysis is needed, especially on 
policy impact, to better figure out the actual role of these “artificial” factors.  
More generally, in all versions (from I/O to CGE) these multisectoral models share common 
drawbacks. Two of them, in particular, may be relevant in the present context. Firstly, they 
often model closed economies or just admit import and export flows but without any explicit 
representation  of  the  links  occurring  with  other  regions.  This  limit  can  be  overcome  by 
constructing  rural-urban inter-regional SAMs (Roberts, 1998; Psaltopoulos et al, 2006) or 
multiregional (often bi-regional) CGE models (Lofgren et al., 2002; Balamou et al., 2008)
21. 
They remain, in fact, aspatial models (Balamou et al., 2007) as do not take into account those 
inter-regional  linkages  that  deserved  increasingly  attention  in  the  last  decade  about  the 
relation between rural-urban areas or between highly-developed and less-developed regions. 
                                                 
20 See Finizia et al (2005), Roberts (2007) and Balamou et al. (2007) for more details and in depth review of this 
literature. Other approaches also use CGE, or SAM, models to analyse the distributional effects of the CAP 
across  different  types  of  farms  (Rocchi  et  al.,  2005;  Cavalletti  and  Rocchi,  2006)  or  on  the  productive 
performance of agriculture itself after the 2003 reform (Gohin, 2006).  
21 This can be achieved also within a SAM model (see Psaltopoulos et al., 2006, for details).   20 
Such aspects involve agglomeration economies, commuting and migration, imperfect market 
competition, and can hardly be included in more conventional CGE models.
22 
Originally designed to analyse international trade and specialization (Krugman, 1991), NEG 
models have been then proposed to study the economy-wide impact of sectoral and regional 
policies taking into account inter-regional core-periphery patterns induced by agglomeration 
economies and non-competitive markets (Gruber and Marattin, 2007). Agriculture tends to be 
closer  to  perfect  competition  than  manufacturing  and  service  sectors.  Moreover,  primary 
production mainly concerns rural areas and regions, and these territories take less advantage 
of agglomeration economies. Therefore, regions with higher presence of agriculture and with 
stronger rural characters may be significantly and negatively affected by aspects emphasised 
in NEG models. The impact of CAP reform may also be influenced.      
Though  multiregional  and  multisectoral,  however,  NEG  models  do  not  usually  provide  a 
sectoral disaggregation comparable with SAM or CGE models. Moreover, information and 
data they require are often not available and consequent calibration remains arbitrary. Until 
now, the real applicability of these models for an insightful analysis of the economy-wide 
effects of CAP is still to be demonstrated. Among the few applications to regional policy 
analysis  we  find  studies  on  trade  and  fiscal  policies  or  on  commuting  behaviour  and 
infrastructure (Gruber and Marattin, 2007), but not on agricultural or rural policies. 
The second major limitation of I/O-SAM-CGE models concerns their fundamentally static 
nature. This occurs not only because coefficients are fixed, as typically happens in I/O tables. 
This problem could be avoided, for instance, by updating I/O tables over time (the so-called 
dynamic I/O models) (Bonfiglio et al., 2006). The critical issue mostly concerns the fact that 
these  are  not  growth  models  as  they  do  not  represent  those  fundamental  mechanisms 
underlying aggregate growth; in particular, capital accumulation and technological change. In 
this sense, they are not dynamic models and, therefore, can not figure out the longer-run 
cumulated effects of a change in the regional economy at a given point of time.
23  
In practice, as also stressed by Balamou et al. (2007), in these models the impact of policies is 
analysed  with  comparative  static  exercises,  that  is,  by  comparing  two  different  static 
equilibria  over  time  (Balamou  et  al.,  2007).  This  misses  the  longer-term  and  permanent 
effects implied by growth and, in particular, those aspects on which recent EU policy reforms 
have paid particular attention. The emphasis on Lisbon-related issues such as human capital, 
R&D and knowledge, depends on the fact that these factors may endogenize technical change 
and permanently improve growth performance of a given regional economy. Representing 
                                                 
22 Some attempts, however, have recently been made in this direction; see Felici et al. (2008), van Bork and 
Treyz (2005) and Thissen (2005) as examples.  
23 It is sometimes made explicit that policy analysis and simulations run with these approaches only represent 
short or medium-terms impacts (Bailey et al., 2006, p. 337). It should be reminded that some very interesting 
dynamic extensions of CGE models have been recently proposed, also for analysising agricultural and rural 
policies (Finizia et al., 2005; Felici et al., 2008). Nonetheless, they still can not be considered growth models 
strictu sensu.        21 
them just as conventional (physical) investments prevents from a more correct evaluation of 
this kind of policies. In particular, some of the typical arguments underlying the convergence 
hypothesis, and the impact of policies in this respect, imply temporary or permanent effects 
on  growth  dynamics  (Esposti,  2008).  As  the  focus  here  is  on  regional  growth  and 
convergence, it represents a major limitation of these models.  
Most convergence studies are based on conventional (neoclassical) aggregate growth models 
which  are,  unfortunately,  not  able  to  represent  the  growth  process  and  the  intersectoral 
linkages at once. However, more recently, multisectoral growth models have been proposed 
and  this  would  allow,  at  least  in  principle,  a  more  correct  representation  of  growth 
implications due to change in intersectoral flows. Esposti (2009) reviews the set of these 
formal models trying to represent such interdependencies within a General Equilibrium (GE) 
framework, thus dealing with the stylised facts of (aggregate) growth and structural change 
(namely, change in sectoral shares) at once. Some of these models also admits trade (open 
economies) thus showing how linkages with other regions (countries) may, in fact, change the 
response of a regional economy to an exogenous shock.  
Though quite promising, this kind of approach can not still be considered a reliable tool for 
policy evaluation for two major reasons. Firstly, there is a weak empirical support underlying 
these models. In most studies, numerical examples are carried out to demonstrate how models 
can  plausibly  reproduce  the  empirical  evidence  but  not  much  is  said  and  done  to  assess 
whether assumptions on which models are drawn really find empirical support. Much work on 
estimation or calibration is therefore needed. A second but more crucial problem concerns the 
role  of  policies.  As  these  models  are  candidates  to  run  policy  evaluation  with  particular 
reference to CAP reform and its economy-wide effects, it must be acknowledged that little 
has been done to clarify how these specific policies (decoupling, modulation, RDP measures, 
etc.) should enter these growth models.
24 Though multisectoral, the disaggregation adopted is 
very limited (there are often two or three-sector models); consequently, the detail with which 
the policy can be modelled has still to be improved. Nonetheless, as will be discussed in 
section 4.2, the use of aggregate growth models may still provide very interesting insights on 
the relation occurring between strictly sectoral policies, such as the CAP, aggregate growth 
and growth convergence within the EU (Esposti, 2007; Bivand and Brunstad, 2003, 2006).   
Within  regional  economics  literature  there  is,  in  fact,  a  long  tradition  of  another  kind  of 
macroeconomic models aimed at analysing regional policies but not specifically designed and 
applied to the CAP. It can be traced back to early pioneering models (as the REMI model; 
Treyz, 1993); the major advantages of these approaches consists in being estimated and not 
calibrated. As such, they are often used to achieve a more reliable evaluation of regional 
                                                 
24  In  this  respect,  it  is  worth  noticing  that  the  HERMIN  model  (Bradley  et  al.,  1995,  2003)  is  based  on 
endogenous  growth  literature  to  capture  the  long-run  supply-side  (that  is,  growth)  impact  of  policies  (EU 
structural funds, in particular). Therefore, it can be considered as a relevant step in the direction of growth 
models suitable for empirical policy analysis. The extension of this model to incorporate the CAP and RDP, 
however, has not been developed so far.      22 
policy impact. More recently, such models have also been designed to study the impact of EU 
structural policies within regional economies and on regional growth. As an example, we can 
mention  the  HERMIN  model  (Bradley  et  al.,  1995,  2003).  These  approaches  have  been 
progressively improved to include both GE and NEG features (van Bork and Treyz, 2005). As 
models of multisector and open regional economies, even in their current state their extension 
to agricultural and rural policy evaluation could be of interest.  
In  general  terms,  extension  and  adaptation  of  all  these  methodological  frameworks  to 
agricultural and rural policy evaluation is relatively recent and should still be improved. Some 
research projects have recently tried to put together the best practitioners in the field trying to 
apply these kinds of approaches to CAP issues. Among others, we can mention the TERA and 
the  ADVANCED-EVAL  research  projects,  both  funded  under  the  6
th  EU  Framework 
Programme.  Several  proposals,  solutions  and  approaches  emerged  in  these  projects  may 
deserve further attention and improvements in the future.
25   
  
 
4.  Evidence 
 
We may finally ask whether empirical research is really able to answer the main questions 
raised in the previous sections. In principle, the abovementioned approaches may afford this 
kind  of  analysis.  They  have  been  used  in  empirical  studies  just  to  cope  with  part  of  the 
problem (taking into account only some CAP measures or scenarios) thus providing an often 
partial and incomplete picture. By collecting and critically reviewing this set of empirical 
studies, however, we may still provide a possible answer on the role and contribution of CAP, 
and 2003-2005 reform, to regional growth and cohesion across the EU. 
To better understand the issue under study, we may articulate the analysis in a sequence of 
four specific questions:  
-  Does an increase of CAP support (in whatever form) favour regional growth? 
-  Does the change in Pillar I support, from price support to coupled direct payments and 
then to decoupled payments (SFP), affect the contribution of CAP to regional growth and 
cohesion? 
-  Does resource shift from Pillar I to Pillar II and, within the latter, from non-Lisbon to 
Lisbon-related measures favour growth (cohesion)? 
-  Does the stronger integration of agriculture within the regional economy (in particular, 
vertical integration with the food sector) and with external economies affect these results 
and how?   
                                                 
25 More details can be found in the respective research sites: www.tera.it and www.adavanced-eval.eu. Not 
discussed here for the lack of published empirical applications so far, but of potential interest for the future, is 
the development, within the ADVANCED-EVAL project, of an Agent-Based Model combined with a General 
Political Economy Equilibrium model (CGPE-ABM) to evaluate RD policies.     23 
The first question is somehow a general and primitive matter on which all other questions 
depend. A longer tradition of empirical studies thus exists on this issue, though it sometime 
presumes a positive answer. We thus start this review of the empirical evidence from two 
extreme perspectives on the first question. 
 
4.1. The distributional argument 
 
The  empirical  analysis  on  the  territorial  or  regional  impact  of  CAP  has  become  a  major 
research concern only in the last fifteen years (Sotte 1995; Laurent and Bowler 1997). This 
can be explained by the fact that the construction of disaggregated regional data on CAP 
support was a major problem, in particular when this support was primarily delivered in the 
form of market intervention. In these early studies how CAP expenditure is distributed across 
EU regions represents the critical question. Though this distributional concern was one of the 
major criticism raised about the CAP already in early eighties (see the Siena Memorandum, 
for instance; Barbero et al., 1984), rigorous empirical studies on this aspect only started in the 
mid-nineties  and  few  pioneering  works  provided  a  major  impulse  in  this  direction.
26  In 
particular we can mention the studies made by Tarditi and Zanias in the late nineties (Tarditi 
and Zanias, 2001) and by the EC in preparation of the Second Report on Socio-economic 
Cohesion (European Commission, 2001a).  
These two studies firstly made clear that the computation of CAP support distribution across 
regions would not, by itself, exhaust the issue. A more rigorous calculation should also take 
into account how regions contribute to the EU (thus, the CAP) budget. When price support 
represented the largest part of CAP support, analysing this side of the distributional issue was 
particularly difficult. Not only did regions  contribute directly to the CAP budget through 
taxes; they also contributed indirectly through higher food prices paid by their consumers. 
But, at the same time, their farmers indirectly received a further support due to higher prices. 
Consequently,  computing  the  net  support  each  region  received  from  the  CAP  meant 
disaggregating the gross contribution of the CAP region-by-region and, then, calculating how 
much each region paid and received directly and indirectly. This calculation was not (and it is 
still not) easy and, therefore, most of the research effort was just spent in such direction in 
order  to  better  understand  the  distributional  implication  of  the  CAP  across  EU  territories 
(regions).  
Empirical evidence emerging from these early studies is, in fact, controversial. Tarditi and 
Zanias  (2001)  concentrate  on  the  impact  of  price  support.  On  the  one  hand,  they  detect 
positive effects (that is, favouring poorer areas) in terms of territorial distribution both among 
countries and within each member country at regional level.
27 On the other hand, despite this 
                                                 
26 See also Kuokkanen and Vihinen (2006, p. 6-10) for a detailed survey of the literature.  
27 Tarschyis (2007) somehow generalizes this conclusion by stating that “if the gross disparities before taxes and 
public expenditures are compared to net disparities after these public interventions [...] we will find that […] 
regional disparities are much smaller than normally assumed”.      24 
positive  distributional  outcome,  price  support  reduces  overall  regional  efficiency,  thus 
hampering competitiveness and economic development. This latter conclusion anticipates the 
discussion in section 4.2. 
If we limit our attention to the purely distributional issue, the EC preparatory study for the 
Second  Cohesion  Report  (European  Commission,  2001a)  provides  a  quite  different 
conclusion. The difference may be explained by the fact that this latter study focuses more on 
direct payments (and the impact of 1992 reform) rather than price support. Nonetheless, it 
eventually concludes that “if we take into account both direct payments and price support, it 
is evident that the distribution of the support has changed not significantly” with the 1992 
reform (European Commission, 2001b, chapter 6, p. 7). As a consequence, “the regions and 
farms, producing more, [continue to] receive also the bulk of the price support. This implies 
an  uneven  distribution  of  support  at  territorial  level  and  between  farms”  (European 
Commission, 2001b, chapter 5, p. 5). 
This latter interpretation on the distributional implication of the CAP became progressively 
prevalent  even  when  support  increasingly  moved  from  price  support  to  coupled  direct 
payments  and,  finally,  to  decoupled  payments.  In  2003  the  ESPON  research  network 
(founded by the EC) started a research project aimed at analysing the distribution of CAP 
support over the EU space (NUTS III regions) with specific emphasis on the possible effect of 
2003 reform and on the differences emerging between Pillar I and Pillar II. The underlying 
hypothesis is that decoupling could imply a reduction in the uneven distribution of support 
across territories and that Pillar II may play a major role in this respect, its funding being 
mostly and allegedly directed towards less developed EU regions.   
The conclusions of this ambitious research work were published in Shucksmith et al. (2005) 
with the title “The CAP and the regions”. The message, at least with respect to Pillar I, is a 
confirmation of the 2001 EC study: Pillar  I of  the CAP works against cohesion as more 
money (at least if measured as support per ha) go to richer regions; that is, it behaves as a 
regressive policy (Nuñez Ferrer, 2007).
28 The 2003 reform (actually started in 2005) is not 
expected to significantly change this outcome, mostly because only few countries opted for 
the  regionalization  scheme  and,  thus,  distribution  of  the  support  across  regions  was 
substantially frozen at the 2001-2003 levels (Shucksmith et al., 2005, p.138).
29 The picture 
emerging for 2000-2006 Pillar  II is not much different. Though large differences emerge 
across measures and countries (INEA, 2006, 2007), the eventual outcome remains the same: 
                                                 
28 “Pillar I support acts in such a way that it does not contribute towards the economic and social cohesion 
objectives of the EU […] Pillar I support per hectare goes unambiguously to richer regions, support per worker 
is distributed more ambiguously” (Shucksmith et al., 2005, p. 58).  
29 “The results suggest that the MTR CAP reform proposals would have increased CAP direct payments more in 
[…] prosperous areas” thus “suggesting that the overall impact of the MTR proposals on farm incomes would be 
territorially neutral” (Shucksmith et al., 2005, p.138). The same conclusion, as mentioned before, was also 
reached  by  the  EC  in  its  Second  Cohesion  Report  with  respect  to  the  impact  of  1992  reform  (European 
Commission, 2001b, chapter 6, p. 7). Anania and Tenuta (2008), however, demonstrate how the introduction of 
regionalization, according to its different possible implementations, may imply relevant distributional effects on 
Pillar I expenditure.    25 
no  clear  negative  relation  occurs  between  Pillar  II  support  and  regional  income.
30  Albeit 
poorer regions tend to be more rural, rural areas of richer regions show a better capacity to 
attract  EU  resources,  and  this  makes  Pillar  II  at  best  neutral  in  distributional  terms 
(Shucksmith et al., 2005, p. 66).  
Partially supported by other studies (Anders et al., 2004), the idea of the CAP working against 
cohesion  on  the  basis  of  such  purely  distributional  argument,  soon  became  prevalent
31 
(Roberts, 2008), and it also gained space in official documents. The Sapir Report itself (Sapir 
et al., 2003, p. 58) states that “adding CAP [both pillars] and the other internal spending 
programme  funds  to  cohesion  policy  disbursement,  the  simple  correlation  between  total 
Community fund disbursement and GDP levels per head across the 17 macro-regions drops 
to –0.4 (in 1991) and to –0.2 (in 1995 and in 2000)”. Quoting the abovementioned ESPON 
study, in its Forth Cohesion Report the EC states that “CAP […] market policy support tends 
to benefit the more developed rural areas […] concentrated more in core regions in northern 
and western Europe and less in the peripheral regions in the east and south”; however, “since 
1992 […] reform of the CAP has increased its effects on cohesion” (European Commission, 
2007a, p. 167). As seen, this latter statement only partially takes into account the empirical 
evidence which would suggest, in fact, that this lack of positive linkage with cohesion could 
also be generalized to Pillar II and to more recent CAP reforms. Nonetheless, these official 
documents  acknowledge  the  possibility  that  Pillar  I  of  the  CAP  may  work  contrary  to 
cohesion objectives across the EU, and that, though the empirical evidence is often based on 
the CAP before the 2003 reform (that is, on data up to 2005), this evidence also suggests that 
such reform is not doing very much to remove this inconsistency. 
These studies on the distribution of the CAP support across EU territories, and its eventual 
change  after  the  recent  reform,  have  the  major  merit  of  focusing  their  attention  on  the 
practical  issues  underlying  the  correct  calculation  of  such  distribution.  At  the  same  time, 
however,  the  conclusions  of  this  stream  of  literature  may  be  questionable  for  two  main 
reasons. Firstly, the alleged inconsistency of CAP with respect to cohesion objectives largely 
depends on how CAP contribution is computed.
32 It can not be considered in absolute values 
(due to the large heterogeneity in regional size) and, while it may be true that support per ha 
is  larger  for  richer  region,  this  is  not  necessarily  the  case  in  terms  of  support  per  AWU 
(Agricultural Working Unit) or of “CAP intensity”, that is per unit of regional GDP or per 
                                                 
30  “Contrary  to  expectations,  Pillar  II  support  is  inconsistent  with  cohesion  objectives,  favouring  the  more 
economically viable and growing areas of the EU” (Shucksmith et al., 2005, p. 66).    
31 “Despite the rural development policies, it is questionable if the CAP as a whole promotes cohesion. The 
contradictory  effect  of  the  CAP  on  cohesion  is  mentioned  in  some  textbooks  on  the  EU”  (Kuokkanen  and 
Vihinen, 2006, p. 7). “The CAP has also been associated with negative […] effects. The distribution of income 
effects has been found to be contrary to the principles of cohesion with the richest areas and farmers benefiting 
most“ (Balamou et al., 2008). 
32 It may be noticed that, differently from Tarditi and Zanias (2001) and EC (2001), the analysis carried out by 
the ESPON study does not really compute net transfers but only considers gross transfers. This may in fact 
generate some misleading evidence. Moreover, it does not consider the whole amount of EU funds received by 
any region, in particular the lagging ones, and thus may cause a further misspecification problem, as will be 
underlined in the next section.   26 
head. The latter measure, in particular, seems more appropriate when dealing with overall 
cohesion  (and  not  with  agricultural  convergence)  and  it  apparently  does  not  reveal  any 
positive correlation between CAP payments and regional GDP (Esposti, 2008). 
The second and more important problem of this distributional argument is that it implicitly 
assumes than one additional Euro spent in the i-th region compared to the j-th region gives the 
former  an  higher  growth  impulse.  In  other  words,  it  assumes  that  CAP  payments  really 
provide a positive contribution to regional growth. As a consequence, if richer regions receive 
a larger support the growth gap with poorer regions is expected to increase. The validity of 
this assumption, however, has never been demonstrated in these studies while, in fact, it is 
strongly questioned by another stream of empirical works that consequently reach an opposite 
conclusion  on  the  relationship  between  CAP,  growth  and  cohesion.  In  general  terms, 
“distributional”  literature  overemphasizes  the  political  issue  of  funds’  allocation  across 
territories, while underestimates the economic relevance of how these funds are spent (Pillar I 
or II, which kind of measures, etc.) within the regional economies, thus activating a complex 
transmission across subjects, sectors and regions.  
 
4.2. The counter-treatment hypothesis  
 
Tarditi and Zanias (2001) and, more generally, Hall et al. (2001), already realized that the 
allocation of CAP funds across regions does not exhaust the issue about the contribution of 
CAP to growth and cohesion. Even if the net contribution of CAP to EU’s poorer regions is 
positive, this does not necessarily imply that these regions grow faster. On the contrary, CAP 
support may prevent regional economies from achieving a more productive sectoral structure 
and more efficient production processes, i.e., from being more competitive. 
In Tarditi and Zanias (2001), this negative effect of CAP on regional competitiveness may 
eventually offset the positive net distribution towards poorer regions they observe. In their 
analysis,  CAP’s  negative  feedback  mostly  operates  through  price  support  that  makes 
agricultural production, agricultural mix and allocation of productive resources across sectors 
inefficient.
33 It would follow that, as market intervention and price support was progressively 
replaced by direct support in 1992 and 2000 reforms, this negative effect on regional growth 
is expected to vanish. This should become even more evident after the introduction, in 2003, 
of decoupled payments whose declared objective, among others, was to favour re-orientation 
of regional agricultures to market according to their specific specializations and comparative 
advantages. 
                                                 
33 In this regard, Kuokkanen and Vihinen (2006, pp. 7 and 11) comment on Tarditi and Zanias’s work as follows: 
“According to the authors, the impact of the agricultural price policy of the EU is a result of different and 
contrasting effects both in terms of equity (income distribution) and efficiency (competitiveness and economic 
development) […]. Farm price support generates large distortions in the domestic market at inter- and intra-
sectoral level, reducing EU competitiveness […]. In the long term, price support hinders structural adjustment 
in rural areas”.     27 
In  terms  of  inter-sectoral  factor  allocation,  however,  direct  payments,  both  coupled  and 
decoupled, may maintain their distorting effects. As far as they remain somehow linked to 
agriculture, their major effect is to increase remuneration of agricultural labour, capital and 
land which will eventually reduce the productivity gap with other sectors and, therefore, the 
progressive loss of resources from agriculture to other uses. If this may definitely occur under 
coupled payments, it is still not clear as to what extent it remains valid under decoupled 
support. This depends on how this support is really independent on maintenance of production 
factors within agriculture. 
Beside the results of Tarditi and Zanias (2001), whose applicability to the current CAP is 
quite limited, as mentioned, we may find only few studies that have tried to empirically assess 
this negative effect of CAP on regional growth and, eventually, on growth cohesion. Here, we 
may mention two recent works by Bivand and Brunstad (2006) and Esposti (2007) who have 
analysed  regional  convergence  across  EU  and  the  role  of  CAP  in  this  respect  within  a 
conventional neoclassical aggregate growth model.
34 
In Bivand and Brunstad (2006) we find both the basic argument and the empirical evidence in 
favour of this interpretation. In their results, “regions with lower net transfer to agriculture 
experience  slightly  faster  growth  than  regions  with  larger  net  transfers”  (Bivand  and 
Brunstad, 2006, p. 288). This evidence is fully consistent with the authors’ expectations: “we 
expect the level of agricultural policy support to be negatively related to regional growth, 
because higher levels of support are likely to slow the reallocation of labour and capital to 
non-agricultural sectors” (Bivand and Brunstad, 2006, p. 287).
35 
In their work, however, the mechanism that would eventually make the CAP work against 
growth is not really incorporated within the adopted approach. Therefore, even if a negative 
relation between regional growth and CAP net transfers may be observed, it is not possible to 
explicitly test the validity of the interpretation proposed by the authors. Also some problems 
with data emerge. These authors compute CAP net transfers apparently only considering price 
support and not direct payments. Since their data refer to 1996, when direct payments had 
been already introduced, this would make results only partially valid. Moreover, their analysis 
neglects that most EU regions also receive a significant amount of funds through structural 
policies. This particularly holds true for those poorer regions that receive a strong specific 
support under Objective 1 (or Convergence Objective) since 1989. Including CAP support 
and  not  these  other  policy  transfers  could  lead  the  econometric  analysis  to  incur 
misspecification problems thus making results less reliable. 
                                                 
34 The use of a conventional growth convergence framework to analyze the CAP’s possible inconsistency with 
regional cohesion has also been proposed by Rodrìguez-Pose and Fratesi (2002). 
35 This concept of CAP as a policy that mainly operates within regional economy by artificially maintaining high 
employment levels in agriculture is also shared by Urwin (1991) who states that the CAP has been since the 
beginning  of  the  eighties  a  social  rather  than  economic  policy,  that  aims  at  maintaining  the  agricultural 
employment, as the industrial and service sectors could not absorb the surplus labour supply (Kuokkanen and 
Vihinen, 2006, p. 12).      28 
Starting  from  the  same  intuition  of  Bivand  and  Brunstad  (2006),  Esposti  (2007)  tries  to 
specifically focus on these latter issues. In this model, CAP support received by each region is 
additional  to  other  EU  funds.  In  particular,  as  the  attention  is  on  the  impact  of  CAP  on 
convergence, CAP support is investigated together with Objective 1 funds to detect whether 
the effects of these funds are reciprocally reinforced or offset. Within an aggregate growth 
model,  CAP  affects  regional  growth  by  compensating  the  lower  labour  productivity  of 
agriculture.
36 As in Tarditi and Zanias (2001) and in Bivand and Brunstad (2006), this could 
slow down regional growth and thus, if structural funds do operate in favour of convergence, 
CAP  eventually  generates  a  counter-treatment  effect.  However,  estimates  obtained  do  not 
support this hypothesis of counter-treatment. The conclusion turns out to be that CAP has a 
substantially neutral effect in terms of regional growth and cohesion.    
It has to be noticed that both quoted works actually refer to years before the 2003 (2005) 
reform (1996 in Bivand and Brunstad; 1999-2000 in Esposti). Therefore, their results could be 
hardly extended to the new CAP. Nonetheless, while Bivand and Brunstad, as Tarditi and 
Zanias,  concentrate  on  CAP  support  deriving  from  market  intervention,  which  makes  the 
extension of results to the current CAP much less reliable, Esposti only considers regional 
support  from  direct  payments.
37  As  CAP  “artificially”  improves  agricultural  labour 
productivity thus retaining labour in the primary sector, the results observed in Esposti could 
also be valid for decoupled payments and, as such, for the CAP reformed in 2003. 
Despite their specific results and shortcomings, these studies are of major interest here as they 
may  eventually  share  the  same  conclusion  with  the  literature  of  the  purely  distributional 
argument: CAP works against cohesion. This conclusion, however, is reached from opposite 
directions. According to the distributional argument, the CAP acts against cohesion because 
poorer regions receive less support, the assumption being that the CAP does favour regional 
growth.  Therefore,  the  major  problem  becomes  how  to  allocate  it  across  EU  territories. 
According to the counter-treatment hypothesis, on the contrary, the CAP may  act against 
cohesion just because it reduces the regional growth performance or, at least, reduces the 
growth enhancing effect of other EU funds. Consequently, redistributing the support in favour 
of poorer regions would not solve the problem.  
Beside the empirical support currently available in favour of this latter interpretation, we can 
acknowledge that it goes more in detail with respect to the questions under discussion here. 
From the point of view of the mere distribution of funds across regions, the 1992, 2000 and 
2003 reforms had a minor impact (European Commission, 2001b; Shucksmith et al., 2005). 
Nonetheless, they did have, as discussed extensively in section 3.2, major implications on 
how these funds are delivered within the regional economies, who and how uses them and, 
eventually, how they affect regional development processes. Therefore, on the one hand, this 
                                                 
36 The Second Cohesion Report itself (European Commission, 2001a) agrees on the fact that, due to lower 
productivity in agriculture, the relative poorer performance of some regions is often linked to the higher degree 
of employment in agriculture.    
37 See Esposti (2007, p. 124) for a more detailed explanation.    29 
perspective seems more interesting. On the other hand, it makes explicit how answering the 
initial questions of this section does require more appropriate approaches.     
 
4.3. Multisectoral models: empirical evidence and limits  
  
The empirical studies mentioned above are not capable to provide any useful insight into the 
processes  that  CAP  activates  within  the  regional  economy  and,  above  all,  can  not  easily 
distinguish, in this respect, the different forms of support. As a consequence, they can say 
little on the impact of 2003-2005 reform. To achieve this, the multisectoral and multiregional 
approaches discussed in section 3.3 may be particularly helpful. 
The purpose, here, is not to provide an exhaustive review of all results provided with this kind 
of approaches. We want to concentrate just on those results that specifically refer to (mostly 
ex-ante)  evaluation  of  the  2003-2005  reform  and,  at  the  same  time,  may  somehow  be 
emblematic  of  potentials  and  limits  of  this  stream  of  studies.  In  practice,  these  empirical 
works model CAP and its reform taking into consideration only some specific aspects (for 
instance, decoupling, modulation or some RDP measures), since including all measures may 
be too complex and, in some cases, unaffordable.
38 Therefore, they often provide a partial 
perspective on the impact of the reform.  
Bonfiglio et al. (2006) analyse the impact of decoupling on rural regions in the Balkan area 
(mostly NMS regions) using an I/O approach.
39 Focusing on accessing regions, besides the 
application of the CAP, policy scenarios also simulate the impact of pre-accession funds and 
of integration with the EU markets expressed as increase in export-import flows. In line with 
Figures  2  and  3,  coupled  direct  payments  enter  the  regional  I/O  tables  as  agricultural 
investments while decoupled payment as consumption (increase in agricultural households’ 
demand). Structural funds, including RDP, are allocated across sectors case-by-case though, 
in general terms, they are considered as investments prevalently concentrated in agriculture 
and in the construction and food sectors. 
As acknowledged by most practitioners in this area (Bonfiglio et al., 2006, p. 126; Balamou et 
al, 2007, p. 21), I/O approaches tend to overestimate the impact of such changes and, as such, 
of  policies.  Nonetheless,  despite  the  reliability  of  their  absolute  values,  results  are  still 
interesting in relative terms, that is, to compare two different kinds of support; for instance, 
decoupled instead of direct coupled payments.   
What emerges from this study, roughly,
40 is that moving from coupled to decoupled support 
has a positive impact on regional output and income (i.e., growth) but not necessarily on 
                                                 
38 For instance, modelling mandatory cross-compliance is not easy within this kind of models.  
39 These are the results of a research project (REAPBALK) funded by the EU under the 5
th FP. Another similar 
application of the I/O methodology to policy evaluation can be found in Mattas et al. (2006).  
40 See Bailey et al. (2006) for a more detailed comparative analysis.    30 
employment  that  may  even  be  decreasing.
41  This  occurs  not  only  because  we  observe  a 
decline in agriculture labour but also for the transmission of decoupling over the economy. In 
particular,  the  introduction  of  decoupled  payments  is  negative  for  those  sectors  more 
vertically  integrated  with  agriculture,  the  food  sector  and  sectors  producing  inputs  for 
agriculture,  in  particular,  while  it  generates  a  positive  stimulus  on  sectors  less  directly 
integrated, for instance services. 
More insightful and reliable results on the impact of CAP reform on regional economies, 
however, can be provided by SAM and, above all, CGE approaches. Not simply because they 
should  not  incur  overestimation  of  the  effects,  but  mostly  because  they  provide  a  more 
flexible  and  composite  representation  of  how  support  is  transmitted.  An  interesting  SAM 
application  to  policy  evaluation  can  be  found  in  Psaltopuolos  et  al.  (2006).  Though  the 
application concerns to a quite specific regional case (in Crete, Greece), the most interesting 
aspect in this study is the use of an inter-regional SAM to describe the linkages and the 
transfer of CAP support occurring among three areas with different income and development 
levels (urban-rural or core-periphery relations). The CAP impact can not be directly referred 
to  the  2003  reform,  as  the  study  only  covers  the  period  1988-1998.  Nonetheless,  CAP 
measures  are  grouped  in  three  categories:  support  to  income,  support  to  agricultural 
productivity  (investments)  and  support  to  other  activities  of  the  regional  economy.  This 
distinction makes this simulation still able to provide useful insight on the effects generated 
by the different uses of funds shown in Figures 2 and 3. 
It comes out that support to agricultural households demonstrates the highest positive impact 
on regional output and employment. Thus, it also generates the largest transfers to bordering 
regions. This latter effect is not so large compared to expectations for a small open economy 
and,  above  all,  it  is  substantially  asymmetric  as  it  favours  more  urban  areas  than  rural 
territories. Moreover, in urban areas the multiplicative effects in favour of other sectors are 
larger than in rural ones. At the same time, support directly aimed at improving agricultural 
performance or at favouring diversification is less effective as it generates smaller leakages 
within and outside the local economy.  
Recently developed CGE approaches may offer a more detailed insight into the combined 
effect of Pillar I and II support especially after the new design of RDP in 2005.
42 Felici et al. 
(2008), by developing an evolution of the REMI model towards general equilibrium features, 
provide an interesting analysis on the impact of some RDP measures within an Italian region 
(Tuscany).  The  interest  in  these  results  mainly  lies  on  the  fact  that  the  authors  consider 
measures  supporting  conventional  investments  within  (measures  1.2.1,  1.2.3)  and  outside 
agriculture  (3.1.1),  measures  favouring  Lisbon-related  investments  (1.1.3)  and,  finally, 
                                                 
41 For a more detailed discussion on the on-farm and off-farm labour allocation under decoupling, see Douarin 
(2008).   
42  Helming  et  al.  (2008),  for  instance,  analyse  the  impact  of  CAP  reform  (mainly  in  terms  of  market 
liberalization)  on  overall  regional  employment  by  using  an  highly  aggregated  CGE    model  called  LEITAP 
which, in turn, is a modified version of the well-known GTAP model.     31 
measures directly supporting income (1.1.2) (see Figures 2 and 3). This model also provides 
an  intra-regional  detail  as  flows  occurring  among  provinces  (NUTS  III)  are  taken  into 
consideration. Another interesting feature is that the model is able to generate results over 
time (the whole period 2007-2020), that is, it is able to take into account the dynamic effects 
induced by these measures (see also Finizia et al., 2005). 
Unfortunately, the authors only report aggregate evidence, without distinguishing between the 
different  measures  and  without  clarifying  whether  the  different  impact  occurring  across 
provinces does depend on the initial allocation of funds or on the consequent transfers due to 
inter-provincial  linkages.  Nonetheless,  results  are  still  interesting  as  they  show  how  the 
impact of these Pillar II measures distributes within the economy. Agriculture is, by large, the 
sector that benefits more (between 0.5% and 2% per year growth rate of sectoral value added). 
The  overall  impact  is  quite  limited,  always  lower  than  0.1%  growth,  either  in  terms  of 
regional  GDP  or  employment.  The  impact  on  the  food  sector,  too,  is  probably  less  than 
expected: lower than 0.3% for both output and employment and about 1/4 of the impact 
observed  in  agriculture.  This  would  suggest  that  Pillar  II  measures,  even  those  allegedly 
aimed  at  improving  productivity  (or  Lisbon-related),  do  remain  mostly  an  agricultural 
intervention with a limited capability to stimulate downstream the non-agricultural industries.             
Among the most relevant recent attempts to use the CGE framework to analyse the effects of 
CAP  reform,  we  can  consider  the  already  mentioned  TERA  project  (Roberts,  2008).
43 
Comparable bi-regional (urban-rural) CGE models have been set-up for 6 EU regions (one for 
each of the following countries: Czech Republic, Finland, Greece, Italy, Latvia, Scotland). 
Within  this  framework,  alternative  policy  scenarios  include  an  overall  reduction  of  CAP 
support, full decoupling and different degrees of modulation (from 20% to 100%).
44 Coupled 
support (also including  price support) enters the model as a negative indirect activity tax 
associated to agriculture, which corresponds to an increase in factors’ productivity within the 
sector. Decoupled support as an increase of agricultural household income; RDP measures as 
investments in non-agricultural sectors and, in particular, all funds are assumed to be invested 
within the construction sector “in an effort to reflect Axes 3 spending” (Pouliakas et al., 2007, 
p. 43).
45 Therefore, the allocation of funds to specific RDP measures is taken into account 
roughly and arbitrarily since funds really spent in Axes 3 are usually quite limited (Sotte and 
Ripanti, 2008; Sotte and Camaioni, 2008) and, as shown in Figure 4, investments flowing 
outside agriculture are a relatively small share.  
                                                 
43 Though not discussed in detail here, another interesting application of a CGE model to the evaluation of the 
impact of CAP reform, and specifically concerning Italian agriculture, can be found in ISMEA (2004).   
44 In order to take into account the differentiated effect of CAP over different agricultural activities, agriculture 
itself  is  disaggregated  in  several  sub-sectors.  Moreover,  other  (non-agricultural)  policies  are  also  simulated 
within this CGE framework (see Pouliakas et al., 2007, for details). As mentioned, the NEG models elaborated 
within the TERA project have been used in scenario analysis, too, but only to simulate non-agricultural policies. 
Therefore, they are not discussed here.  
45  However,  in  some  regions  other  sectors  are  also  involved  (education,  business  services  and  public 
administration).    32 
Nonetheless, results emerging from this simulation are of major interests. The first remarkable 
outcome is that a 30% decrease in CAP support (without any other kind of compensation) 
may produce a very limited negative impact on overall regional growth and, in some cases, 
the impact can be even positive as it favours reallocation of factors outside agriculture.
46 This 
evidence  would  support  the  counter-treatment  hypothesis  while  making  the  distributional 
argument intrinsically less significant. In fact, the major implication of this reduction is not on 
growth but on income distribution as it favours urban and non-agricultural households against 
agricultural and rural ones.   
Results concerning decoupling are very interesting though very much surprising. On the one 
hand,  in  relative  terms  and  as  expected,  decoupling  tends  to  benefit  non-agricultural  and 
urban households and sectors. This urban-rural distributional effect is larger than in previous 
scenario  because  decoupling  allows  a  stronger  factors’  reallocation  out  of  agriculture. 
However, at the same time, the overall impact of decoupling on regional growth is negative, 
more than what observed under the reduction of coupled support. The fact that a reduction of 
CAP  expenditure  generates  a  better  (less  negative)  growth  impact  than  what  obtained 
maintaining  the  same  expenditure,  though  spent  in  other  forms,  is  really  unexpected  and 
definitely  deserves  further  assessment.  The  explanation  of  this  result  lies  on  the  strongly 
negative impact of decoupling on primary production
47 which then transmits this negative 
effect  downstream  and  upstream  to  integrated  sectors.  The  positive  effect  on  other  less 
integrated sectors benefiting from decoupling (through consumption or factors’ reallocation) 
is larger than in the case of reduced coupled support, but still not large enough to compensate 
the reduction on the primary and integrated sectors. 
A final evidence concerns modulation. In this scenario, results are more strongly case-specific 
as for some regions the overall impact on growth is the highest, whereas in others is negative 
and also worse than other scenarios. Therefore, moving resources from Pillar I to Pillar II 
generates an effect whose sign and magnitude largely depends on regional characteristics. 
However, in general terms modulation activates a relevant reallocation process within the 
rural  economy  as  the  primary  sector  looses  output  and  employment  in  favour  of  non-
agricultural rural sectors, and in particular in favour services. On the one hand this would 
demonstrate  that  more  funds  delivered  through  Pillar  II  are  not  able  to  compensate  the 
negative  effects  of  decoupling  in  the  primary  sector  but  this  can  still  be  possible  in 
downstream  sectors,  for  instance  the  food  industry.  This  reallocation  within  the  rural 
territories also amplifies the transmission towards urban areas as leakages in this direction are 
evidently  higher  with  respect  to  strictly  agricultural  support.  However,  it  must  also  be 
                                                 
46 As well emphasized by Tarditi and Zanias (2001) and EC (2001), this positive impact should also occur for the 
reduction of tax burden and food prices that increases the real income available to consumers. Given the specific 
way coupled support is included in these CGE models, however, these aspects are seemingly neglected. Also that 
part of price support that, as demonstrated by the OECD (1995) study, that actually goes to non-agricultural 
sectors is not entirely visible.   
47  This  is  evidently  an  expected  result,  largely  confirmed  by  other  studies  (Gohin,  2006),  though  here  the 
production decline may be more intense.   33 
acknowledged  that  these  results  may  be  strongly  affected  by  how  Pillar  II  is  arbitrarily 
modelled, as funds received through modulation are not allocated among actual measures but 
enter exclusively as investments in the construction sector. This possibly overestimates its 
effects on other rural sectors and on urban areas.   
 
5. Some concluding remarks: Does the CAP reform work for regional growth?  
 
This paper analyses the role of CAP and its recent reform in fostering regional growth and 
cohesion across EU regions. Though growth and cohesion represent two key-aspects of the 
current long-term strategy of the Union, this is only a partial perspective on the CAP, whose 
objectives  and  implications,  either  sectoral  or  general,  are  evidently  more  composite. 
Therefore, here we do not consider the important environmental and social aspects of CAP 
reform that, definitely, should not be excluded in an appropriate evaluation work (Midmore et 
al., 2008).  
This partial point of view on the CAP reform also explains why the objective of this paper is 
not to provide suggestions on how CAP should be and which direction its next reforms should 
take.  The  analysis  here  is  merely  positive:  it  looks  for  the  existing  evidence  about  the 
contribution of the CAP to regional growth and critically reviews it. However, this review of 
the literature is not exhaustive as not all empirical works dealing with this aspect can be 
considered here. We only consider the most recent ones (specifically analysing the 2003-2005 
reform) and those that seem more promising for the methodology they use and results they 
produce.  
With respect to the four basic questions raised earlier in section 4, the reviewed evidence 
provides incomplete answers. First of all, CAP may be not neutral in terms of regional growth 
and, above all, its impact is not necessarily univocal. An increase in overall support may even 
reduce  regional  growth  implying  that  allocation  of  funds  across  regions  is  not  by  itself 
informative on the consequence in terms of cohesion (or convergence). 
More than allocation across regions, what seems critical in terms of growth implications is the 
allocation of assigned funds within the region. In particular, the change in Pillar I support 
from price support to coupled direct payments and, finally, to decoupled payments, implies an 
increasingly  negative  impact  on  agricultural  production  and  employment  that,  if  not 
compensated otherwise, may transmit to vertically integrated (either upstream or downstream) 
sectors. At the same time, due to factor reallocation outside agriculture, it may favour growth 
of other sectors which would eventually compensate the first negative impact. Ultimately, this 
compensation may generate an overall positive impact on growth. In most cases, however, 
empirical works indicate a negative effect of decoupling in regions that are more dependent 
on agricultural production (namely, rural areas), while benefits mostly favour urban areas and 
non-agricultural  households.  This  transfer  of  benefits  across  sectors  or  regions,  however, 
depends on how and how much a certain region is integrated with the bordering territories.   34 
The key role of Pillar II measures, especially in its new strategic orientation, should be to 
compensate the negative impact of Pillar I reform on agricultural production and integrated 
sectors. By favouring the introduction of innovations, of new physical and human capital, and 
the  creation  of  diversified  activities,  RDP  should  promote  efficiency  and  productivity 
improvements in agriculture and other “rural” sectors. Apparently, however, this does not 
happen  in  most  cases.  According  to  several  empirical  studies,  these  measures  do  favour 
reallocation of support towards non-agricultural sectors within the rural economy, but their 
final  impact  remains  prevalently  limited  to  agriculture  though  still  not  compensating  the 
negative  effect  induced  by  decoupling.  Moreover,  positive  effects  on  non-agricultural 
activities are often transferred outside rural regions. Evidently, a more clear-cut targeting of 
Pillar II measures to specific needs and territories has still to be achieved. 
These results are of major interest for the discussion on the effect of 2003-2005 reform and, 
above all, on the direction to be taken with the HC and post-2013 CAP reform. At the same 
time, they should be  commented carefully as they  evidently do not fully  consider all the 
possible implications of the reform itself. In particular, the adopted methodologies can usually 
not adequately represent the impact that some measures (of both pillars) may have on farm 
efficiency  and  productivity.  Decoupling  itself,  as  well  as  several  Lisbon-related  RDP 
measures,  may  improve  these  performances  as  demonstrated  by  a  significant  amount  of 
studies (Lambarree et al., 2008; Latruffe et al., 2008a, 2008b). After all, as already mentioned, 
models here considered are not, in most cases, growth models. Therefore, they do not pay 
enough attention to factors emphasized by the recent growth literature such as innovation, 
human capital, knowledge and on the consequent growth dynamics they activate. Evidently, 
on this aspect, significant improvements of the adopted methodologies can be expected. 
The same argument also holds with respect to public (mostly environmental) goods. Even 
considering the contribution of the CAP only from a strictly growth perspective, it should be 
acknowledged that supporting the creation of public goods within agricultural production may 
have a positive growth impact both on the primary sector and on other economic activities. 
They may improve factor productivity in the long run and create new business opportunities 
for  farmers,  thus  also  favouring  integrated  sectors.  However,  even  in  this  case,  currently 
adopted methodologies and models do not specifically take care of these aspects. This may be 
a major drawback also with respect to future developments of the CAP, since many scholars 
and policy makers are putting an increasing emphasis on the provision of public goods as 
major CAP justification (Buckwell, 2008; Dutch Ministry of Agriculture, Nature and Food 
Quality, 2008).      
Research in this field should aim at improving the currently adopted methodologies in these 
directions.  At  the  same  time,  efforts  should  continue  on  more  practical  aspects.  The 
systematic  collection  of  data  and  the  construction  of  a  complete  and  consistent  regional 
dataset reporting the allocation of CAP gross and net support is an unfinished work, and it is 
expected to improve (European Commission, 2001b). It must be acknowledged, in fact, that   35 
the different results reported in the literature may still depend on the different computation of 
regional CAP support. More and better statistical information (obtainable, for instance, by 
improving the set of information collected through the FADN) is also needed on how CAP 
support is used by first-level recipients (mostly farmers) among different alternatives (saving, 
consumption, different kinds of investment in agricultural activity) depending on how this 
support is delivered (through prices, coupled or decoupled direct payments, Pillar II measures, 
etc.). 
Though having in mind the need to improve the adopted research tools and the partial and 
incomplete evidence they provide, we may still try to draw at least two policy implications 
from these results. The first one is that the enlarged EU is extremely heterogeneous across its 
regions  and  this  makes  the  answer  to  questions  above  strongly  region-specific.  Empirical 
results show that this answer may even be opposite moving from one region to another due to 
their large intrinsic and structural differences. For instance, comparing a Scottish and a Greek 
region,  Balamou  et  al.  (2008)  show  how  the  growth  implication  of  decoupling  may 
substantially diverge.  
The development stage, the role and performance of agriculture and its integration with other 
sectors (mostly, the food sector), the region openness to trade, migration, commuting and 
capital flows, are all critical aspects for the regional economy’s response to policy (CAP) 
changes. This makes modularity a strategic requisite to render EU policies more effective: 
what can be good for a region might not be good for another. It must be acknowledged that 
current CAP already contains different degrees of modulation. Regions (in practice, countries) 
may at least partially decide on the amount of coupled and decoupled Pillar I support to 
provide (for instance, through article 69 of 2003 reform that will be presumably maintained 
also within the HC). This flexibility in using Pillar I funds could be improved, in principle, by 
allowing  co-financing.  Mandatory  and  (where  present)  voluntary  modulation  can  give 
flexibility in allocating resources between Pillar I and Pillar II according to the specific needs. 
Flexibility, to a significant extent, also exists in allocating Pillar II funds among the different 
measures.  
In  practice,  the  only  modulation  that  regions  (or  countries)  can  not  afford  concerns  the 
currently weak coordination and integration between the CAP and structural funds, also for 
the different respective programming documents and procedures. However, an attempt could 
be made to give the regions the possibility to modulate resources between EAGF-EAFRD and 
structural policies. This solution would somehow follow an argument  already  stressed by 
Tarditi and Zanias (2001) and confirmed by Kuokkanen and Vihinen (2006, p. 8): “if such 
[CAP] transfers were allocated from rich to poorer regions without sectoral constraints, their 
impact would be much larger and more transparent”.  
The  second  policy  implication  has  mostly  to  do  with  the  inter-regional  and  urban-rural 
distribution of effects. Evidence shows that, besides the initial allocation of funds, what really 
matters in assessing the impact of CAP across territories is how funds are then transmitted   36 
over space. In particular, the progressive decoupling of Pillar I support and modulation in 
favour of Pillar II, though justifiable by a number of good reasons, may have the undesirable 
effect to favour urban regions (areas) to the detriment of rural ones. 
This spatial redistribution inevitably affects the enduring debate on the regional allocation of 
CAP funds and its coherence with cohesion objective (the “distributional argument”) and, 
above all, informs the current debate about the regionalization of SFP. Depending on how 
regionalization is actually implemented, its alleged impacts (Anania and Tenuta, 2008) may 
be substantially amplified or reduced once these redistributional transfers across territories are 
appropriately taken into account.  
This effect is strongly region-specific also, and it depends on the degree of openness of the 
regional economy under study and on the integration with the bordering regions. Therefore, a 
viable solution in this respect can hardly be generalized. But one possible policy development 
could be to allow strongly integrated regions (especially within urban-rural or core-periphery 
patterns) to also have an integrated management of CAP resources, at least of those admitting 
regional  programming.  For  instance,  in  the  case  of  RDP  and  maybe  only  involving  few 
selected measures, multiregional programmes could be admitted to allow territories to take 
into account, and then compensate, these redistributional effects.     37 
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Appendix 
 
Table A.1 – Reclassification of RDP measures according to the different uses 
  RDP 2004: measure codes  RDP 2007: measure codes 
Agricultural Household Income  d, e.1, e.2, m, x.1, x.2, z, ab  1.1.3, 1.3.1, 1.3.2, 2.1.1, 
2.1.2, 2.1.3, 2.2.4 
Agricultural Investments  
(non-Lisbon) 
a, j, k, u, v, ac, aa  1.2.1, 1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.5, 
1.2.6, 1.3.3 
Agricultural Investments  
(Lisbon-related) 
b, c, g, l, y  1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.4, 1.1.5, 
1.2.4, 4.1.1 
Public goods  f, h&i, i.2, q, t  2.1.4, 2.1.5, 2.1.6, 2.2.1, 
2.2.2, 2.2.3, 2.2.5, 2.2.6, 
2.2.7, 4.1.2 
Other sectors – Household Income  -  - 
Other sectors – Investments  
(non Lisbon) 
n, o, p, r, s, w  3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.3, 3.2.1, 
3.2.2, 3.2.3, 4.1.3, 4.2.1 
Other sectors – Investments 
(Lisbon-related) 
-  3.3.1, 3.4.1, 4.3.1 
Source: Elaboration on European Commission (2007c) 